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COMMENT
RESTORING THE GATEKEEPER:
HOW ILLUSTRATIVE NOTICE PLEADING CAN SAVE
THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL SYSTEM
John Robert Toy II†

I. INTRODUCTION
When the United States Supreme Court decided to review its
interpretation of the procedural rules concerning pleadings, its decisions in
Bell Atlantic v. Twombly1 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal2 became the center of a legal
and academic controversy.3 Twombly, though decided in 2002, is one of the
twenty cases cited most often in federal court opinions,4 and Iqbal is
currently cited by federal courts nearly three hundred times every month.5
There is general recognition that the combined force of Twombly and Iqbal
changed the interpretation of the pleading standard for a plaintiff’s
complaint, but the legal community differs on whether this change is a
negative or a positive development for civil litigation.
This Comment takes the position that while the intended change in the
pleading interpretation was a positive development, the ensuing
divisiveness created more problems than solutions. The answer to this is the
adoption of illustrative notice pleading. This position may appear to be
centrally one of semantics, but it is not. Perception is reality, and there are
growing and divergent perceptions that plausibility either completely
eviscerated notice pleading6 or that plausibility merely tweaked notice

† Law Review Senior Staff; J.D. Candidate, Liberty University School of Law, May
2012; B.A., Middle Tennessee State University, 2001. I dedicate this Comment to my wife,
Addie, and my daughter, Maisie, who both sacrificed much for me to pursue my dream of
studying to become an attorney.
1. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2002).
2. Aschcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
3. Alexander A. Reinert, The Costs of Heightened Pleading, 89 IND. L.J. 119, 120 (2011).
4. Robert D. Owen & Travis Mock, The Plausibility of Pleadings After Twombly and
Iqbal, 11 SEDONA CONF. J. 181, 181 (2010).
5. Id.
6. “A procedural system requiring that the pleader give only a short and plain
statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief, and not a complete detailing
of all the facts.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1271 (9th ed. 2010).
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pleading. Both fundamentally fail to understand the rationale underpinning
plausibility, which was to reassert the proper role of the judge as the
gatekeeper of the court. The reexamination of the judge’s role as the
gatekeeper of the court was a needed and long overdue step for the Supreme
Court, but the shrouded mystery of plausibility failed to bolster confidence
in pleading procedure. A judge’s role as gatekeeper gives him the
responsibility to justly and efficiently manage the limited resources of the
judicial system. Too narrow an emphasis on either justice or efficiency
results in neither being achieved. The judge has the duty to ensure that
meritorious claims receive every opportunity for resolution while
preventing frivolous claims from draining judicial resources.
Modern pleading standards fall into one of two categories: code pleading,
which is more commonly known as fact pleading,7 required in several state
courts, or notice pleading, followed by the federal courts and those states
that have adopted the federal standard.8 This is true despite the new
interpretation of the pleading standard. Fact pleading requires the
complaint to allege sufficient factual information to establish a cause of
action conclusively.9 Before the establishment of fact pleading, the standard
was common-law issue pleading,10 which required a plaintiff to focus his
litigation on a single issue for judicial resolution.11
While both fact pleading and issue pleading produced contests over the
form of the pleadings rather than the substance of the case,12 notice
pleading moves the focus of contestation to the substance of the case and

7. “A procedural system requiring that the pleader allege merely the facts of the case
giving rise to the claim or defense, not the legal conclusions necessary to sustain the claim or
establish the defense.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1271 (9th ed. 2010). Fact pleading proved to
be hyper-technical and difficult to navigate for plaintiffs, which resulted in the denial of too
many legitimate cases.
8. Jay S. Judge, Federal Notice Pleading vs. State Fact Pleading, THE LAW OFFICES OF
JUDGE, JAMES, & KUJAWA, LLC (last visited Nov. 19, 2010), http://www.judgeltd.com/
pdf/federalcourts080806.pdf. This article is a PDF reprint from a publication entitled
LAWYERS’ FORUM.
9. KEVIN M. CLERMONT, PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 38-39 (2005).
10. “The common law method of pleading, the main purpose of which was to frame an
issue. Cf. code pleading.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1271 (9th ed. 2010) (defining “issue
pleading”). Issue pleading required plaintiffs to pursue only one claim at a time, which
proved to be an inefficient use of judicial resources. Issue pleading predates the idea that
courts could resolve all of the legal or equitable issues arising from an event.
11. CLERMONT, supra note 9, at 39.
12. Id.
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allows greater access to discovery.13 Notice pleading, as interpreted prior to
Twombly, overcorrected for the deficiencies in fact and issue pleading,
which resulted in both a near abandonment of the judge’s role as gatekeeper
and a dramatic increase in cost and time for each case by allowing
speculative claims admittance to the discovery system.14 This increased role
of discovery—sorting out the validity of claims—created an environment
that nourished the filing of meritless lawsuits. These counter-productive
results necessitated that the Supreme Court consider whether changing the
interpretation of the pleading standard could be a viable solution for courts
and litigants. The change in interpretation occurred in Bell Atlantic v.
Twombly, where the Court established that to survive a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim,15 the claims presented in the pleadings must
include enough factual allegations for the claim to be plausible.16 The
divisions over the new requirement of plausibility became a vast chasm of
opinion and vigorous debate in an area of law generally thought to be
routine.
The process of filing a complaint is a ubiquitous part of the American
judicial system. Regardless of the position a person takes as to the impact of
Twombly and Iqbal, no legal professional practicing in civil courts can
escape the impact of these rulings. This Comment considers the current
state of pleadings in the United States by examining the ongoing debate of
the effect of Twombly and Iqbal and by offering a solution to the confusion
wrought by plausibility. Understanding the foundation of our pleadings
jurisprudence is essential to understanding the nuance of the current debate
about pleading standards. Therefore, Part II examines the history of
pleading, focusing particularly on the judicial application of procedural
pleading rules.17 Part III discusses the problem of unnecessary confusion
caused by the plausibility standard, which created divergent positions put
forth by the opposing sides in the debate over pleading standards. This Part
examines both those who regard the ramifications of Twombly and Iqbal
negatively and those who view the changes positively.18 Part IV offers the
solution of illustrative notice pleading, which preserves the spirit of
Twombly by reestablishing the proper judge’s role as the court’s gatekeeper
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id.
Judge Paul M. Spinden, Lecture at Liberty University School of Law (Oct. 26, 2009).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2002).
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
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by requiring plaintiffs to offer actual examples rather than mere conclusions
of the elements required for a claim, while not demanding that these factual
examples be of such weight as to rise to the strict standard of fact pleading.19
II. BACKGROUND
A. Early Pleading Requirements
American jurisprudence once required federal judges to apply one
distinct set of procedural standards to cases in equity and a separate,
dissimilar set of procedural rules for cases at law, which were governed by
the procedural standards of the state in which that federal court resided.20 If
an attorney specialized either in equity or in legal litigation, that attorney
reaped the benefit of uniformity between state and federal courts in his
jurisdiction since he needed to master only one set of procedural rules.21
Attorneys who primarily practiced in the federal court system, however,
faced the daunting task of learning and complying with procedural
standards that were markedly different in each of the fifty states.22 This
reality, coupled with the growing recognition that legislation was not the
most efficient means of crafting procedural rules, prompted Congress to
pass the Rules Enabling Act in 1934.23 This legislation created a standard
procedural scheme for all of the nation’s federal courts.24 While this shift
resulted in different state and federal procedural rules within each
19. See infra Part IV.
20. CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 31-34 (2d ed. 1947).
21. Michael C. Dorf, Meet the New Rules of Civil Procedure: Same as the Old Rules?,
FINDLAW (Wed., July 18, 2007), http://writ.lp.findlaw.com/dorf/20070718.html.
22. Id.
23. History & Society: Rules Enabling Act, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA (retrieved Oct.
05, 2010), http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1305059/Rules-Enabling-Act.
The Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1934), states the following:
(a) The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules of
practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United States
district courts (including proceedings before magistrate judges thereof) and
courts of appeals.
(b) Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right. All
laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such
rules have taken effect.
(c) Such rules may define when a ruling of a district court is final for the
purposes of appeal under section 1291 of this title.
24. Dorf, supra note 21.
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jurisdiction, many states avoided the problems of differing rules by
modifying existing state procedural rules to conform to the new federal
model.25
B. The Establishment of a Liberal Federal Pleading Standard
In 1957, the Supreme Court’s holding in Conley v. Gibson26 established
the interpretation of the pleading standard that federal courts would follow
for nearly half a century.27 The Court held that “a complaint should not be
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle
him to relief.”28 This “no set of facts” standard encapsulated the legal
community’s desire to move far from the exacting requirements of fact
pleading.
In Conley, employees of a labor union sued their union claiming that
union representatives intentionally failed to represent the employees’
interests properly due to racial discrimination.29 The uncontested facts of
the case included the employment of the petitioners at the Texas and New
Orleans Railroad in Houston; that the union, Local 28 of the Brotherhood,
was to represent the employees under the Railway Labor Act; and that the
union was empowered to protect employees from discharge and loss of
seniority.30 The allegations centered on the claim that the Railroad
discharged or demoted forty-five Negro31 workers and filled those positions
with white workers.32 The claim that the union failed to protect the interests
of the Negro workers in the loss of jobs and loss of seniority for those who

25. Id.
26. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), abrogated by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 560-61 (2002).
27. Id. at 45-46.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 42-43.
30. Id. at 43.
31. It is the author’s opinion that the original language from precedential case law
should be preserved in academic writing against the modern evolution of language, even
when changes to the language are done as a development of cultural sensitivity. The author
believes that too much is lost in the true understanding of the rationale and opinions of the
courts when the snapshot of that time in history is distorted by modern revisions to the
language.
32. Conley, 355 U.S. at 43.
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were rehired magnified this injury.33 The complaint concluded by noting
the lack of good faith representation by the union, which was a violation
under the Railway Labor Act, and asserting that the petitioners were
entitled to declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and damages.34 Upon
review of the pleadings, the Court issued its interpretation of the noticepleading requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8,35 which resulted in deference to
plaintiffs that effectively abrogated the judge’s role as the gatekeeper of the
court.
Over time, pleadings became an inconvenient formality—given the low
threshold under Conley, a pre-printed form for docket entry would likely
have sufficed—due to notice pleading’s requirement that a claim would
proceed to discovery unless it was manifestly impossible to credit any fact in
support of the complaint.36 This eliminated any need for a claimant to
weigh the merits of his claim before filing a lawsuit since a court would
allow the opportunity to uncover support for the claim during discovery.37

33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.
(a) Claim for Relief. A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain:
(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction,
unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new
jurisdictional support;
(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief; and
(3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or
different types of relief.
....
(d) Pleading to Be Concise and Direct; Alternative Statements; Inconsistency.
(1) In General. Each allegation must be simple, concise, and direct. No
technical form is required.
(2) Alternative Statements of a Claim or Defense. A party may set out 2 or more
statements of a claim or defense alternatively or hypothetically, either in a
single count or defense or in separate ones. If a party makes alternative
statements, the pleading is sufficient if any one of them is sufficient.
(3) Inconsistent Claims or Defenses. A party may state as many separate claims
or defenses as it has, regardless of consistency.
(e) Construing Pleadings. Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice.
36. Fact Based Pleading: A Solution Hidden in Plain Sight, UNIVERSITY OF DENVER:
INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM (last visited Oct. 6, 2010),
http://www.du.edu/legalinstitute/pubs/Fact-BasedPleading.pdf.
37. Id.
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The judge’s role as a gatekeeper effectively transformed into one focused on
moderating discovery.
In Conley, the stated purpose behind a pleading standard that required
only fair notice was to allow “liberal opportunity for discovery and the other
pretrial procedures.”38 The Court based its rationale on its reading of Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2), which requires “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”39 Reasoning that it must give
full effect to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(f)’s call for pleadings not to be construed in a
way that renders injustice, the Court believed that pleadings must be a very
low hurdle to overcome.40
By choosing to frame the standard of pleading so liberally, the Court
rejected the idea that “pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by
counsel may be decisive to the outcome.”41 Instead, the Court declared that
pleadings should safeguard the principle that court decisions should rely
solely on the merits of a case.42 The actual result of Conley, though, was that
the meritorious cases the Court sought to protect often ended before trial
due to the crushing burden of time and resources expended during
discovery.43 The original purpose of both discovery and summary judgment
was to determine if legitimate claims could carry the burden of proof
required by law, but this idea has been perverted into a complex and
expensive process of ferreting out frivolous claims that should never have
seen the inside of a courtroom.44 From the decision in Conley in 1957 until
Twombly and Iqbal, lawsuits survived a motion to dismiss for failing to state
a claim despite providing nothing of any substance beyond putting the
other party on notice.45

38. Conley, 355 U.S. at 47.
39. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
40. Conley, 355 U.S. at 48. The current rule states “Construing Pleadings. Pleadings
must be construed so as to do justice.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(e).
41. Conley, 355 U.S. at 48.
42. Id.
43. Fact Based Pleading: A Solution Hidden in Plain Sight, UNIVERSITY OF DENVER:
INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM (last visited Oct. 6, 2010),
http://www.du.edu/legalinstitute/pubs/Fact-BasedPleading.pdf.
44. Id.
45. Alexander A. Reinert, The Costs of Heightened Pleading, 89 IND. L.J. 119, 119 (2011).
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C. The Rebellious Lower Courts and Heightened Pleading Standards
Before Twombly, the Supreme Court consistently rejected attempts to
implement a heightened pleading standard.46 The Twombly decision itself
references two examples:47 Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics
Intelligence & Coordination Unit48 and Swierkiewicz v. Sorema.49 Both cases
proposed the idea that cases involving federal civil rights should be subject
to a higher bar for pleadings, akin to that required under Fed. R. Civ. P. 9. 50
46. Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter
Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 544, 566 (2010).
47. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 584 (2002).
48. Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intel. & Coord. Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993).
49. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
50. Fed. R. Civ. P. 9.
(a) Capacity or Authority to Sue; Legal Existence.
(1) In General. Except when required to show that the court has jurisdiction, a
pleading need not allege:
(A) a party’s capacity to sue or be sued;
(B) a party’s authority to sue or be sued in a representative capacity; or
(C) the legal existence of an organized association of persons that is made a
party.
(2) Raising Those Issues. To raise any of those issues, a party must do so by a
specific denial, which must state any supporting facts that are peculiarly within
the party’s knowledge.
(b) Fraud or Mistake; Conditions of Mind. In alleging fraud or mistake, a party
must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.
Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged
generally.
(c) Conditions Precedent. In pleading conditions precedent, it suffices to allege
generally that all conditions precedent have occurred or been performed. But when
denying that a condition precedent has occurred or been performed, a party must
do so with particularity.
(d) Official Document or Act. In pleading an official document or official act, it
suffices to allege that the document was legally issued or the act legally done.
(e) Judgment. In pleading a judgment or decision of a domestic or foreign court, a
judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal, or a board or officer, it suffices to plead the
judgment or decision without showing jurisdiction to render it.
(f) Time and Place. An allegation of time or place is material when testing the
sufficiency of a pleading.
(g) Special Damages. If an item of special damage is claimed, it must be specifically
stated.
(h) Admiralty or Maritime Claim.
(1) How Designated. If a claim for relief is within the admiralty or maritime
jurisdiction and also within the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction on some
other ground, the pleading may designate the claim as an admiralty or
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In Leatherman, the complaint alleged that law enforcement officers
violated the defendants’ civil rights during searches for illegal narcotics.51
The district court dismissed the complaint because it did not meet the
heightened pleading standard for civil rights cases against the government.52
The district court based the heightened pleading standard it applied on
Fifth Circuit decisions, which subsequently affirmed the lower court
decision.53 The Supreme Court invalidated the Fifth Circuit’s heightened
pleading standard.54 The Fifth Circuit based its heightened pleading
requirement on Fed. R. Civ. P. 9, which includes a requirement for
particularized pleading,55 but the Supreme Court rejected this basis, noting
that civil rights litigation against municipalities under 42 U.S.C. § 198356

maritime claim for purposes of Rules 14(c), 38(e), and 82 and the Supplemental
Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims and Asset Forfeiture Actions. A claim
cognizable only in the admiralty or maritime jurisdiction is an admiralty or
maritime claim for those purposes, whether or not so designated.
(2) Designation for Appeal. A case that includes an admiralty or maritime claim
within this subdivision (h) is an admiralty case within 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3).
51. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 164-65.
52. Id. at 165.
53. Id. (referencing the lower court decision Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics
Intel. & Coord. Unit, 755 F. Supp. 726 (N.D. Tex. 1991), rev’d, 507 U.S. 163 (1993)).
54. Id. at 168.
55. Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that
in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in
such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the
District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of
Columbia.
Id.
Section 1983, as this statute is commonly referred to, provides a remedy against the
government for violating citizens’ constitutional civil rights. It is an exception to the
sovereign immunity normally enjoyed by the government and government officials. As
evidenced by Swierkiewicz, courts routinely attempted to raise the pleading standard as a
means of protecting the government from legal actions.
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was subject to pleading requirements under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, not Fed. R.
Civ. P. 9.57
In Swierkiewicz, the complaint alleged that the defendant’s employer
violated Title VII by undertaking discriminatory practices.58 The district
court dismissed the complaint because it failed to present a prima facie
case.59 The district court based the need for a prima facie showing in the
complaint on settled precedent noted by the Second Circuit, which
subsequently affirmed the district court’s ruling.60 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari and held that the Second Circuit misinterpreted the
precedent cited in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,61 which the Court
clarified to be an evidentiary standard requirement of a prima facie case
rather than a pleading requirement.62
Following Leatherman and Swierkiewicz, lower courts continued to defy
the Supreme Court’s holdings against heightened pleading standards.63
Litigation involving 42 U.S.C. § 1983 particularly drew continued boundary
pushing in search of a heightened pleading standard.64 The issue of
requiring a prima facie case in employment cases based on discriminatory
conduct also continued to surface despite the holding of Swierkiewicz.65
Despite this resistance from the lower courts, the Supreme Court never
waivered in its position that Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 does not require any form of
heightened pleading and made specific reference to this fact in its decision
in Twombly.66

57. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168.
58. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506, 508 (2002).
59. Id. at 509.
60. Id.
61. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
62. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 510.
63. Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 987 (2003).
64. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228, 1235 (11th Cir. 2003); Oliver v. Scott, 276
F.3d 736, 741 (5th Cir. 2002); Ramirez v. Dep’t of Corr., 222 F.3d 1238, 1241 (10th Cir.
2000).
65. See, e.g., Totten v. Norton, 421 F. Supp. 2d 115, 120 (D.D.C. 2006).
66. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569 n.14 (2002). “In reaching this
conclusion, we do not apply any ‘heightened’ pleading standard, nor do we seek to broaden
the scope of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9 . . . .” Id.

2011]

RESTORING THE GATEKEEPER

253

D. Plausibility
Despite the growing evidence of a broken system, there was relative quiet
on the issue of the pleading standard following Conley until the Supreme
Court broke the silence in its 2002 decision in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly.67 In
Twombly, the Supreme Court faced a complaint that adhered strictly to the
interpretation of the pleading standard commanded by Conley and a split
decision on the application of that pleading standard by the district court
and the court of appeals.68 This split provided the necessary opportunity for
a renewed look at the interpretation of the pleading standard. Though
Twombly was a good case for reviewing the pleading standard, the facts of
Twombly contributed significantly to the post-Twombly conclusion that the
holding applied only to complex litigation.69
Twombly featured a complaint that alleged violations of the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act.70 In 1984, AT&T’s local phone business was broken apart,
resulting in the establishment of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers
(ILECs).71 In exchange for a regional monopoly on local telephone service,
the law prohibited the ILECs from providing long distance telephone
service.72 The Telecommunications Act of 1996 ended this arrangement by
putting an end to the ILECs’ monopolies and facilitating competition.73 As a
trade-off for the loss of the business monopoly and the introduction into
the market of Competitive Local Exchange Carriers (CLECs), the ILECs
could now offer customers long distance telephone service in addition to
local service.74
The issues presented in the litigation centered on accusations that the
ILECs engaged in parallel conduct and agreed to forego competing against
each other.75 The Telecommunications Act of 1996 required ILECs to share
their networks with the CLECs.76 The ILECs resisted this sharing
67. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544.
68. Id. at 546, 552-53.
69. Judge Posner Questions Reach of High Court Decisions on Civil Lawsuits, AM.
CONSTITUTIONAL SOC’Y BLOG (Aug. 7, 2009, 1:33 PM), http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/judgeposner-questions-reach-of-high-court-decisions-on-civil-lawsuits.
70. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 548.
71. Id. at 549.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 550-51.
76. Id. at 549.
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component of the law, resulting in the Federal Communications
Commission revising its interpretation of the Telecommunications Act of
1996 three different times.77 The complaint suggested that the ILECs
restrained trade by parallel conduct, which included inflating consumer
charges for services, providing lower quality network connections to
CLECs, and billing CLECs in a manner intended to impair the CLECs
customer relations.78 The argument followed that had the ILECs not
engaged in such conduct, the CLECs would have been more successful.79
The complaint additionally alleged that the ILECs agreed to respect one
another’s territory by not competing against each other.80 The support for
this second claim was that the ILECs were not competing against one
another, so they must have agreed not to do so.81 The essence of the
complaint was that there must be something going on or else circumstances
would be different.
While the district court recognized that the complaint presented
circumstantial evidence meant to be persuasive, it refused to allow that
evidence to be a substitute for genuine support of a conspiracy.82
Recognizing that a circumstantial complaint alone does not actually state a
claim, the court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6).83 84 The complaint presented the trappings of a conspiracy
in a magnificent fashion but lacked grounds to support a genuine inference
of the conspiracy.85
The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and held that a
complaint did not need a “plus factor” to proceed to discovery.86 While the
Second Circuit recognized that a complainant must plead in a manner
sufficient to demonstrate the possibility of a claim, the court strictly
77. Id. at 549-50.
78. Id. at 550.
79. Id. at 551.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 552.
83. Id.
84. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
(b) How to Present Defenses. “Every defense to a claim for relief in any pleading
must be asserted in the responsive pleading if one is required. But a party may
assert the following defenses by motion: . . . (6) failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted . . . .” Id.
85. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 552.
86. Id. at 553.
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interpreted Conley and held that a dismissal could be granted only when no
facts could support the leap from possible to demonstrable.87 According to
the Second Circuit’s strict reading of the Conley standard, if a judge could
imagine the existence of supporting facts, then a judge could allow a case to
proceed to discovery, even if the parties themselves failed to allege any facts
in support of a required element.
Faced with this split reading of the Conley interpretation, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari and resurrected the question of the proper
interpretation of the standard of pleading for Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).88 The
underlying task before the Court was to determine what was required under
the pleading standard.89 Considering the absence of any facts and the
abundance of accusations, the Court decided the complaint in Twombly was
not sufficient to overcome the motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6).90
To support this decision, the Court methodically examined the general
rules of notice pleading based on Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).91 The Court cited
Conley to reiterate the standard that Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) is satisfied by a
complaint that is a short plain statement showing an entitlement to relief
and putting the defendant on fair notice.92 The Court cited Sanjuan v.
American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology, Inc. to dispel the notion that a
complaint under siege from a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
does not require exacting, factual recitations.93 The Court cited to Papasan
v. Allain for the rule that courts are not compelled to take simple conclusory
labeling and mere narrations of legal causes of action as true, noting that a
plaintiff’s complaint is required to rise above this manner of pleading.94 The
Court cited to Neitzke v. Williams to dispel the idea that a judge’s disbelief

87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 554-55.
90. Id. at 570.
91. Id. at 555-56 (interpreting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).
92. Id. at 555 (“[A]ll the Rules require is ‘a short and plain statement of the claim’ that
will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which
it rests.” (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
93. Id. (“complaints need not contain elaborate factual recitations” (paraphrasing
Sanjuan v. Am. Bd. of Psychiatry & Neurology, Inc., 40 F.3d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 1994)).
94. Id. (“Although for the purposes of this motion to dismiss we must take all the factual
allegations in the complaint as true, we are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion
couched as a factual allegation.” (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).

256

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6:243

in a factual allegation should have any bearing in the decision of dismissal.95
Finally, the Court cited Scheuer v. Rhodes to address the concern that a
defendant’s odds of recovery are not a factor to be considered in deciding a
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion.96
According to Justice Souter, writing the majority opinion, for a
complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) required
sufficient facts pled to establish plausibility.97 He noted that “[a]sking for
plausible grounds . . . does not impose a probability requirement at the
pleading stage; it simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of [the allegation made in the
complaint].”98 Justice Souter reasoned that the introduction of plausibility
as the pleadings standard indicated nothing more than the recognition of a
line between conclusory statements and genuine facts; a pleading needed
only to cross this line to meet the Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) requirements.99
Recognizing that the Second Circuit’s reading of Conley is what led to the
conclusion that a “claim will suffice unless its factual impossibility may be
shown from the face of the pleadings[,]”100 the Court decided that under
such a standard a claimant would never need to plead anything more
substantive than conclusory assertions.101 This was not a standard the Court
was willing to adhere to any longer. The Conley interpretation eliminated
the need for a showing that the complainant actually alleged a claim under
which relief could be granted.102 Nevertheless, the Court’s introduction of
plausibility as the standard for pleadings created confusion as to the reach
of this new standard; did the requirement of plausibility affect all pleadings
or merely complex litigation similar to that at issue in Twombly, and exactly
what was “plausibility”?

95. Id. at 556 (“What Rule 12(b)(6) does not countenance are dismissals based on a
judge’s disbelief of a complaint’s factual allegations. District court judges looking to dismiss
claims on such grounds must look elsewhere for legal support.” (quoting Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)).
96. Id. (“The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the
claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.” (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416
U.S. 232, 236 (1974)).
97. Id.
98. Id. (alteration in original).
99. Id. at 557 n.5.
100. Id. at 561.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 562.
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E. The Reach of Twombly Questioned
1. Confusion Reigns
The confusion engendered by the concurrence of complicated facts and a
less-than-clear Supreme Court opinion in Twombly spawned commentary
as to the scope of Twombly’s effect on the pleading standard. Although
there is not a clear consensus, commentaries center on the idea that
Twombly, while not limited to its facts, is limited to complex litigation. The
belief is that the Court, despite its clear notation to the contrary, enacted a
heightened pleading standard.
One early criticism of the Court was that no clear standard emerged for
litigators and judges to follow.103 The sense was that the Court had placed
pleadings into unfamiliar territory.104 The focus of the disquiet was on the
term “plausibility,” given by the Court as the new threshold for a sufficient
complaint.105 Plaintiffs viewed this shift as a mystery that, if nothing else,
certainly foretold of more robust challenges to complaints.106
An additional source of confusion surrounding Twombly was the Court’s
decision in Erickson v. Pardus,107 which vacated and remanded the dismissal
of a pro se litigant’s complaint.108 The Court cited Twombly, but the
deficiency of facts in the complaint left many observers with a nowgrounded assumption that Twombly was applicable to only complex
litigation.109
2. A Prudent Change
Another reflection of Twombly is that plausibility was an overdue change
to the pleading standard that focused more on judicial economy.110 This
rationale is that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were written at a time
when class actions and complex, expensive discovery were unknown.111 The

103. Jason G. Gottesman, Speculating as to the Plausible: Pleading Practice After Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 17 WIDENER L.J. 973, 1003 (2008).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007).
108. Id. at 94-95.
109. Gottesman, supra note 103, at 1003-04.
110. A. Benjamin Spencer, Understanding Pleading Doctrine, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1, 36
(2009).
111. Id.
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enormous costs associated with modern discovery simply cannot be
justified for litigation that presented non-plausible facts.112 Embracing this
idea of judicial economy requires recognition that certain types of cases will
necessarily face more difficulties in constructing sufficient complaints.113
Proponents of this reasoning also suggest that the Twombly standard should
be relaxed for certain types of cases or that there should be discovery reform
to permit limited, early stage discovery to bolster the crafting of the
complaint.114 This compromise suggests a means of maintaining the
efficiency wrought by Twombly without sacrificing access to justice.115
Absent any compromise, advocates of a judicial-economy reading of
Twombly hope that courts will consider the challenges some plaintiffs will
face in presenting facts acceptable after Twombly.116
3. The Parroting Lower Courts
There is also a sense that the lower courts exacerbated the confusion as to
Twombly.117 The argument is that the plausibility standard needed
refinement by the lower courts.118 As the circuits applied Twombly in
practice, the majority of the Court opinions offered no elucidation on the
standard since the courts merely quoted the language from Twombly—
parroting the rule without offering additional guidance.119 The parroting of
the rule by the lower courts, without any additional gloss, deprived the legal
community of a bright-line rule regarding the standard of plausibility.120
Without such a clear rule, there can be nothing but a case-by-case
application of plausibility, which accordingly offers no guidance to
watching attorneys and potential plaintiffs.121 Commentators critical of the
lower court’s refusal to refine the Twombly standard believed that it was the

112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Anthony Martinez, Plausibility Among the Circuits: An Empirical Survey of Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 61 ARK. L. REV. 763, 785 (2009).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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duty of the circuits to perform this function until the Supreme Court
decided to expound further on its new pleading standard.122
4. Iqbal Foretold
While the majority of commentary focused on the belief that Twombly
was limited to complex litigation, the minority recognized that the
plausibility standard was meant to be all-encompassing.123 This minority
recognized that steadfast observance of Twombly must have far-reaching
effects.124 The minority’s reflection on the Twombly decision noted how
careful the Court was in requiring a close scrutiny of complaints that were
conclusory and scant on factual assertions.125 The plain language of Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a) requires this close scrutiny.126 The minority observers noted that
any argument as to Twombly’s reach being limited inherently adopted the
fallacy that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply differently to
different cases.127 While acknowledging that the costs associated with
complex litigation may warrant closer scrutiny, the Twombly Court’s
holding was grounded in the language of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), which applies
uniformly to all civil cases.128 It was the language of the rules and not a
policy consideration that wrought Twombly. Therefore, the holding simply
could not be limited to particular cases.129
While textual interpretation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
produced Twombly, the ramifications the decision had on the role of the
courts and the effect on discovery cannot be discounted.130 The expense of
civil litigation and the imperatives associated with discovery justified the
introduction of a new pleading standard regardless of the Court’s reliance
on a textual interpretation of the Rules.131 The genuine risks that too many
cases reach settlement based on factors other than the meritorious nature of
the claims alone required some prompting for a greater judicial role in

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id.
Douglas G. Smith, The Twombly Revolution?, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 1063, 1099 (2009).
Id. at 1100.
Id. at 1099.
Id. at 1099-1100.
Id. at 1100.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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scrutinizing complaints.132 Twombly embodies this vital, systematic
progression toward improving civil litigation.133
F. The Affirmation of Twombly’s Reach
In 2009, Ashcroft v. Iqbal imparted the answer that all pleadings needed a
plausible claim.134 In Iqbal, the plaintiff claimed deprivation of his
constitutional rights by the terrorism policies promulgated by officials in
the Bush Administration.135 The complaint, though, failed to “‘nudge[] [
his] claims’ of invidious discrimination ‘across the line from conceivable to
plausible.’”136
In addressing the sufficiency of the complaint, the majority opinion,
written by Justice Kennedy, quoted from Twombly rather than Conley; this
evidenced that the concept of plausibility was applicable across the federal
court system.137 The Court stressed that Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) demanded
“more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation.”138 Specifically, it found complaints that offer nothing more
than labels, conclusions, listings of elements, or naked assertions to be
unacceptable.139 Justice Kennedy noted “a claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows [a] court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.”140
The rationale supporting Twombly relied on two principles.141 First, “the
tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a
complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”142 The Court, while
recognizing the requirement to accept factual allegations, stated that no
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).
135. Id. at 1942. Specifically the plaintiff claimed he was “subjected . . . to harsh
conditions of confinement on account of his race, religion, or national origin.” Id.
136. Id. at 1950-51 (alteration in original).
137. Id. at 1949. The simple act of Justice Kennedy choosing to quote from Twombly
rather than Conley settled the debate regarding whether Twombly was intended to be limited
in scope.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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binding authority required a court to accept “as true a legal conclusion
couched as a factual allegation.”143 Additionally, Justice Kennedy drew
attention to the fact that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
“hyper-technical” form of pleadings that existed prior to the Federal Rules
bear no resemblance to one another.144
Second, the Court held that the trial judge had discretion to determine
when “a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion
to dismiss,”145 acknowledging that this determination of plausibility was
dependent upon the context of each case.146 The Justices expected judges to
rely on both experience and common sense in determining whether a
complaint crossed the threshold of plausibility.147 Nevertheless, the Court
held that an outer limit of this judicial discretion might be found in the
understanding that “where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to
infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has
alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]’-‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’”148
The transition from the no-set-of-facts standard of Conley to the
plausibility standard of Twombly unleashed a firestorm of controversy
centered on whether Twombly negatively changed notice pleading or
whether the shift was merely a more precise description of the discretion
judges historically held.149 The following section examines the debate over
the change in the interpretation of the pleading standard.
III. THE PLEADINGS CIVIL WAR
A. Something Wicked This Way Comes
While complaints now need to recite a plausible claim, the opinions
discussed in this section believe a sea change occurred in civil litigation
under Twombly and Iqbal. It is true that plausibility requires a plaintiff to
give more than bare notice, but the arguments proffered here tend to
portray this change as a very negative development. This subpart begins

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 1949-50.
Id. at 1950.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).
See infra Part III.
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with the dissenting Justices of the Supreme Court150 and concludes with a
discussion of the legislative reaction to Twombly and Iqbal.151
1. The High Court Dissenters
The natural beginning for the discussion of the viewpoint most hostile to
plausibility is with the dissenting Justices from Twombly and Iqbal. The
initial criticism leveled was that the new standard dispensed with claims
without requiring, at a minimum, that the defendant file an answer.152
Simply taking the defense attorney’s word that there is no substance to the
plaintiff’s allegations is something the Court should not encourage.153 At a
minimum, the dissenting members of the Court thought that precedent and
reason require “some sort of response from petitioners before dismissing a
case.”154
The dissent acknowledged that lawsuits are expensive and that
complicated lawsuits can cause confusion for a jury.155 Justice Stevens,
writing for the dissent, proffered that the answer to these concerns is more
care and oversight of the case.156 In building their case, the dissenting
Justices considered that history validated the idea that plausibility has no
place in modern civil procedure. Justice Stevens examined the word choice
of the drafters of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); he argued that the phrase “a short
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”
was not accidental or caused by inattention.157 The language was chosen
specifically to clarify the Field Code of 1848, which itself was a response to
the cumbersome pleading standard of the common law.158
When a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) results in a case dismissal,
the court dismisses the case with prejudice, thereby disposing of a plaintiff’s
claim and denying him his day in court.159 According to Justice Stevens, that
result is diametrically opposed to the purpose of notice pleading, which is to

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

See infra Part III.A.1.
See infra Part III.A.2.
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 572 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 573.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 573-74.
Id.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 537 (9th ed. 2010) (defining “dismissed with prejudice”).
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keep litigants in court so that the dispute can be adjudicated.160
Additionally, the dissent asserted that notice pleading was better served
under the Conley standard.161 In support of this assertion, the dissenting
Justices pointed to the twenty-seven jurisdictions that adhere to the notice
pleading standard under some iteration of the Conley interpretation.162 The
dissent viewed plausibility as nothing more than an ill-informed and hasty
departure from a trusted standard.163
This trusted standard removed from the judge the burden of discerning
the merits of a case, shifting that burden to the adversarial processes of
discovery, summary judgment, and trial.164 In the dissenting Justices’
opinion, without properly considering the context of pleadings, the
majority applied reasoning more suited for a summary judgment
decision.165 The absence of even basic evidence in the form of affidavits or at
minimum, a response from the defendant, rendered plausibility
incompatible with precedent.166

160. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 575 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 577.
162. Id. at 578 n.5. See, e.g., EB Invs., LLC v. Atlantis Dev., Inc., 930 So. 2d 502, 507 (Ala.
2005); Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs. v. Native Vill. of Curyung, 151 P.3d 388, 396 (Alaska
2006); Newman v. Maricopa Cnty., 808 P.2d 1253, 1255 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991); Public Serv.
Co. of Colo. v. Van Wyk, 27 P.3d 377, 385-86 (Colo. 2001) (en banc); Clawson v. St. Louis
Post-Dispatch, LLC, 906 A.2d 308, 312 (D.C. 2006); Hillman Constr. Corp. v. Wainer, 636
So. 2d 576, 578 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Kaplan v. Kaplan, 469 S.E.2d 198, 199 (Ga. 1996);
Wright v. Home Depot U.S.A., 142 P.3d 265, 270 (Haw. 2006); Taylor v. Maile, 127 P.3d 156,
160 (Idaho 2005); Fink v. Bryant, 801 So. 2d 346, 349 (La. 2001); Gagne v. Cianbro Corp.,
431 A.2d 1313, 1318-19 (Me. 1981); Gasior v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 846 N.E.2d 1133, 1135
(Mass. 2006); Ralph Walker, Inc. v. Gallagher, 926 So. 2d 890, 893 (Miss. 2006); Jones v.
Mont. Univ. Sys., 155 P.3d 1247, 1252 (Mont. 2007); Johnston v. Neb. Dept. of Corr. Servs.,
709 N.W.2d 321, 324 (Neb. 2006); Blackjack Bonding v. Las Vegas Mun. Ct., 14 P.3d 1275,
1278 (Nev. 2000); Shepard v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 638 S.E.2d 197, 199 (N.C. 2006); Rose v.
United Equitable Ins. Co., 632 N.W.2d 429, 434 (N.D. 2001); State ex rel. Turner v. Houk,
862 N.E.2d 104, 105 (Ohio 2007) (per curiam); Moneypenney v. Dawson, 141 P.3d 549, 551
(Okla. 2006); Gagnon v. State, 570 A.2d 656, 659 (R.I. 1990); Osloond v. Farrier, 659 N.W.2d
20, 22 (S.D. 2003) (per curiam); Smith v. Lincoln Brass Works, Inc., 712 S.W.2d 470, 471
(Tenn. 1986); Ass’n of Haystack Prop. Owners v. Sprague, 494 A.2d 122, 124 (Vt. 1985); In re
Coday, 130 P.3d 809, 814-15 (Wash. 2006) (en banc); Haines v. Hampshire Cnty. Comm’n,
607 S.E.2d 828, 831 (W. Va. 2004); Warren v. Hart, 747 P.2d 511, 512 (Wyo. 1987).
163. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 579.
164. Id. at 584-85.
165. Id. at 586.
166. Id.
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Additionally, the plausibility standard was a resurrection of the legal
distinctions of factual allegations and legal conclusions.167 As Justice Stevens
considered, that distinction was a relic of fact pleading and had no place in
the federal courts.168 In true paternalistic fashion, he warned that the
majority would learn of its folly in due course.169
The dissenting Justices in Iqbal expressed frustration at the Court’s
implementation of the Twombly interpretation of the pleading standard.
Justice Souter claimed the majority misapplied the standard crafted in
Twombly to the complaint in Iqbal.170 Souter’s dissent posited that the Court
fundamentally misunderstood what was required under Twombly.171 He
noted that Twombly did not require a court to test the probability of the
truth of an allegation; rather, a court must set aside skepticism and accept
the veracity of a complaint at the pre-trial stage of litigation.172 Justice
Souter mockingly asserted that only tales of aliens and time travel should
warrant dismissal at such an early stage of court proceedings.173 The dissent
stated that the court must accept the allegations as true and simply inquire
whether there is a plausible ground for relief.174
2. The Legislative Response
The dissenting Justices were not the only ones second-guessing the
majority on the matter of the new pleading standard interpretation.
Congress, which has certain authority over the federal courts,175 took an
active interest in the new interpretation of the pleading standard.176 Former
Senator Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania introduced the Notice Pleading

167. Id. at 589-90.
168. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 587. “I fear that every age must learn its lesson that special pleading cannot be
made to do the service of trial . . . experience has found no quick and easy short cut for
trials . . . .” Id.
170. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1955 (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting).
171. Id. at 1959.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. U.S. CONST. art. III.
176. Brian Wolfman, Senator Specter Introduces Bill to Overrule Twombly & Iqbal,
CONSUMER LAW & POLICY BLOG (July 23, 2009), http://pubcit.typepad.com/clpblog/
2009/07/senator-specter-introduces-bill-to-overrule-twombly-iqbal.html.
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Restoration Act of 2009 in the United States Senate,177 and Congressman
Jerrold Nadler of New York introduced the Open Access to Courts Act of
2009 in the United States House of Representatives.178 Combined, the two
pieces of legislation have thirty-six co-sponsors, all of whom are
Democratic representatives.179 Former Senator Specter firmly believed the
Court altered the standard for pleadings negatively.180 His legislation
suggests that the Court gave too much discretion to trial judges—implying
that those judges will abuse this discretion to punish disfavored litigants.181
Forcing a return to the Conley standard is the aim of both pieces of
legislation.182 The bills, however, are still in committee; with a new
Republican majority in the House and Senator Spector having left the
Senate, it is unlikely either bill will become law.183
The arguments that the Supreme Court’s new interpretation of the
pleading standard is a negative development in civil litigation are
persuasive. The reality is that plaintiffs’ attorneys in federal court now face a
situation where the judge will closely scrutinize complaints that contain
conclusory statements. The judge is to ensure that the claim, once the
conclusory statements are removed, is at least plausible based on the facts
presented. Nevertheless, the arguments that the new interpretation of the
pleading standard is a positive development present a more compelling case
that is examined in the following section.
B. Restoring the Gatekeeper
Before analyzing the standard itself, the Supreme Court majority in
Twombly chastised the dissent for suggesting that notice pleading did not
require the presentation of any facts.184 The majority contended that the
dissent failed to recognize that even under Conley-based notice pleading, a
claim must make a showing of the right to relief, not merely bandy an

177. Senator Introduces Bill to Address High Court Decision on Civil Lawsuits, AM.
CONSTITUTIONAL SOC’Y BLOG (July 24, 2009, 10:41 AM), http://www.acslaw.org/node/13821.
178. Open Access to Courts Act of 2009, H.R. 4115, 111th Cong. (2009).
179. Id.
180. Senator Introduces Bill to Address High Court Decision on Civil Lawsuits, AM.
CONSTITUTIONAL SOC’Y BLOG (Jul. 24, 2009, 10:41 AM), http://www.acslaw.org/node/13821.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. H.R. 4115.
184. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 n.3 (2002).
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accusation.185 This can be reduced to the understanding that before and
after Twombly a plaintiff must put a defendant on notice, not simply that he
is being sued, but why he is being sued. This subpart begins with the
reactions of the Third and Seventh Federal Circuit Courts186 and concludes
with an additional discussion of the rationales supporting Twombly and
Iqbal.187
1. The Circuits React
The concern that Twombly and Iqbal created an opportunity for claims
to be dismissed too early must be tempered by the reality that judges must
still apply the standard of plausibility to actual cases.188 The application of
the standard is subject to the variables of context, jurisdiction, and judge.189
This mixture was present before Twombly and is an equally determinative
force now. An example can be seen in the application of the plausibility
standard in two cases by the Third Circuit: Phillips v. County of Allegheny190
and Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside.191 The plausibility standard required one
level of specificity for claims relating to negligence but required more
particularity for a claim relating to antitrust.192
In Phillips, the Third Circuit first applied the new plausibility
requirement under Twombly.193 In its discussion of how to apply the new
standard, the court stressed that the context of the case was the most
important factor in determining whether a complaint should be
dismissed.194 The Phillips court understood that the Supreme Court in
Twombly was not enacting a new standard.195 Rather, the court viewed
Twombly as a carefully-based restatement of pre-existing principles that a

185. Id.
186. See infra Part III.B.1.
187. See infra Part III.B.2.
188. C. James Zeszutek & Randal M. Whitlatch, Best Pleading Practices in Federal Court
Following Twombly and Iqbal, DINSMORE & SHOHL LLP (Aug. 9, 2010),
http://www.dinslaw.com/best_pleading_practices_in_federal_court.
189. Id.
190. Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224 (3d Cir. 2008).
191. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2009).
192. Zeszutek, supra note 188.
193. Phillips, 515 F.3d at 230.
194. Id. at 232.
195. Id. at 233.
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claim had to show the moving party was entitled to relief, not merely make
the recitation that the party was entitled to relief.196
In Fowler, the Third Circuit divided its analysis into two parts for
deciding if a complaint should survive a motion to dismiss.197 The first step
was to untangle the factual and legal elements of the complaint leaving only
the facts, which must be taken as true, for review at the pre-trial stage.198
The second step was to determine, based solely on the facts actually alleged,
whether the plaintiff showed a plausible claim for relief.199 Analysis of this
test indicates that nothing is genuinely different under Twombly and Iqbal
except that courts are now explicitly required to consider the context of a
claim when deciding a motion to dismiss.200 That it took a new
interpretation of the pleading standard to motivate judges to actually
examine a case within its context at the pre-trial stage shows just how
broken the Conley standard was. While it was necessary for Twombly and
Iqbal to retire the Conley interpretation of the pleading standard,201 the
cases did not radically alter civil litigation.202
The Seventh Circuit, like the Third Circuit, also addressed the
application of plausibility in two recent cases.203 Judge Easterbrook wrote
the first case, U.S. ex rel. Lusby v. Rolls-Royce Corporation.204 In the opinion,
he defined the necessary detail that a complaint must include “the who,
what, when, where, and how: the first paragraph of any newspaper story.”205
Additionally, he wrote that inferred facts were satisfactory since the entire
principle of circumstantial evidence is built on treating inferences as
factual.206 Judge Easterbrook concluded that “[i]t is enough to show, in
detail, the nature of the charge, so that vague and unsubstantiated
accusations . . . do not lead to costly discovery and public obloquy.”207

196. Id.
197. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009).
198. Id. at 210.
199. Id. at 211.
200. Zeszutek, supra note 188.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. U.S. ex rel. Lusby v. Rolls-Royce Corp., 570 F.3d 849 (7th. Cir. 2009); Smith v.
Duffey, 576 F.3d 336 (7th Cir. 2009).
204. Rolls-Royce Corp., 570 F.3d at 850.
205. Id. at 853 (quoting DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 627 (7th Cir. 1990)).
206. Id. at 854.
207. Id. at 854-55.
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The second case from the Seventh Circuit was Smith v. Duffey.208 The
majority opinion, penned by Judge Posner, noted the court’s reluctance to
apply Twombly to the case before it because Twombly dealt with complex
litigation and Duffey did not.209 The Supreme Court, however, decided Iqbal
one week after the Seventh Circuit heard oral arguments in Duffey.210 The
Seventh Circuit wrestled with whether Iqbal was necessary; in Judge
Posner’s opinion, the interpretation of the pleading standard was less
important than the merits of the case itself.211 In Duffey, he went so far as to
comment that the complaint was so deficient that it needed dismissal under
any interpretation.212 Both Judge Easterbrook and Judge Posner believed
that the debate over the new interpretation of the pleading standard was
overwrought.213
2. A Better Understanding
The implementation of Twombly and Iqbal demonstrates that the
introduction of plausibility was an attempt at a better formulation of the
discretion judges had under the Conley standard but too often failed to
exercise. While a review of case law is informative, a closer review of the
rationale of Twombly and Iqbal is also important.
The Supreme Court has the sole authority to overrule its precedents. But
the Court did not seek to overturn any precedent from the Conley era in
either Twombly or Iqbal.214 This includes unanimous decisions that flatly
rejected the need for greater detail in support of an allegation.215 The
problem with the view that Twombly and Iqbal were radical departures
from notice pleading is due to a misinterpretation of the plausibility

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Duffey, 576 F.3d at 336.
Id. at 339-40.
Id. at 340.
Id.
Id.
Maxwell S. Kennerly, Posner and Easterbrook Put Brakes on Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
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standard.216 The requirement that a complaint present a plausible claim is
necessary only if the complaint itself is full of conclusory statements that
need to be disregarded under a proper motion-to-dismiss analysis.217 If the
complaint is free from conclusory statements, then there is no need for the
plausibility test.218 The real issue is to understand what qualifies as a
conclusory statement. A conclusory statement should be understood to
mean a claim that fails to relate to any real world person, place, or event.219
Consider Form 11 of the Federal Rules, “which provides that a complaint
would be sufficient simply by alleging ‘On <Date>, at <Place>, the
defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against the plaintiff.’”220 The
view that notice pleading was overruled or that civil litigation suffered a
severe undermining via Twombly and Iqbal is simply wrong. The retirement
of the Conley interpretation and the introduction of the Twombly
interpretation were intended to reinstate the proper function of the judge as
the gatekeeper of the court. Nevertheless, the concept of plausibility has
prevented this goal from being fully realized.
IV. ILLUSTRATIVE NOTICE PLEADING
The best understanding of the requirement of Twombly that a complaint
include sufficient facts to present a plausible claim is this: it is a more
refined articulation of the standard judges should have followed before
Twombly. The problem is that the persons who necessarily implement
pleading interpretation theory into practice are deeply divided over this
understanding because of the uncertainty created by the plausibility
standard. 221 The solution is for courts to adopt illustrative notice pleading.
Illustrative notice pleading is the spirit of Twombly encapsulated in a
standard that eschews the amorphous concept of plausibility in favor of the
idea that conclusory statements need to be replaced with factual examples
that illustrate that each particular element of a cause of action has substance
beyond the mere recitation of the prime facie elements. The requirement of
plausibility was, in retrospect, a poor choice of wording by the Supreme
Court and needs to be discarded.
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The true underlying intent of Twombly was to force plaintiffs to provide
judges sufficient information in a complaint to recognize that the claim was
not frivolous. Rather than focus on the revival of the appropriate role of
judges, the concept of plausibility became the focus of the Twombly
holding, which is why the debate over something as important but
mundane as pleadings will not end until the Court recognizes that its goal
of more efficient justice is being subsumed in a petty legal squabble that is
“sound and fury, signifying nothing.”222
Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano223 is emblematic of this problem.
Carrying on in apparent ignorant bliss, a unanimous Supreme Court
correctly rejected a motion for dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) that
argued that the complaint failed to meet the standard of Twombly. The
problem is not in the Court’s ability to understand its own rule, but rather
in the fact that plausibility has so blinded the legal community. Just a
portion of a single paragraph224 in the Matrixx opinion prompted an article
in Lawyers USA suggesting that this decision was somehow another
reinvention of the pleading standard.225
The article asserts that Matrixx “takes a step back to the fundamental
philosophy of notice pleading.”226 This assertion that the Matrixx opinion
relaxed the pleading standard set by Twombly is founded on the belief that
Twombly rejected notice pleading.227 This is a perfect example of a legal
professional equating plausibility with a heightened standard of pleading.228
The problem with plausibility is that despite the Court’s effort to be clear
that notice pleading was still the standard for federal complaints and that
plausibility was entirely consistent with the requirements of notice
pleading,229 serious commentary still misunderstands the rationale of the
Twombly holding. Since plausibility continues to confound the legal
222. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH act 5, sc. 5.
223. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309 (2011).
224. “We believe that these allegations suffice to ‘raise a reasonable expectation that
discovery will reveal evidence’ satisfying the materiality requirement, Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly (citation omitted) and to ‘allo[w] the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,’ [Ashcroft v.] Iqbal (citation omitted).” Id.
at 1323.
225. Kimberly Atkins, U.S. Supreme Court Tweaking ‘Twiqbal’?, LAWYERS USA, May
2001, at 1.
226. Id. at 27.
227. Id. at 1, 27.
228. Id.
229. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2002)

2011]

RESTORING THE GATEKEEPER

271

community, it is time for the Court not to abandon its rationale of
Twombly, but to abandon the concept of plausibility. Only by removing the
spotlight from plausibility will the Court allow the legal community to
understand that Twombly was meant to restore the judge’s role as
gatekeeper.
To further understand how illustrative notice pleading is the solution to
the problem of plausibility, it is helpful to understand how illustrative
notice pleading works. Illustrative notice pleading is analogous to creating a
resume. Whether recently laid-off or a freshly-minted graduate, any
successful resume writer must focus his resume on the intended reader; the
same is true of a complaint.230 In addition, resumes need to show the reader
the characteristics possessed by the applicant rather than tell the reader.231
For example, a resume should not state that the applicant is “an excellent
writer,” but it should explain that the job-seeker wrote and published three
law review articles during his first year of law school. Similarly, no job
seeker would ever consider asserting on his resume that he was simply well
educated. Rather, an applicant offers in detail the educational credentials he
has earned through years of hard work.
Similarly, no woman would believe that she is loved by a man who is
distant and cold toward her merely because he tells her he loves her. Rather,
he needs to show her he loves her. We instinctively know in every facet of
our lives that showing something bears the mark of truth that telling can
never replicate. Yet, in our legal system, we have for far too long tolerated
the insincerity of telling. It is this narrative showing of the plaintiff’s story
that makes illustrative notice pleading the answer to the confusion caused
by the plausibility standard.
The Supreme Court never intended a return to fact pleading or sought to
destroy civil procedure as we knew it. Rather, the Supreme Court simply
wants a plaintiff who wishes to utilize the judicial system to show why he is
entitled to relief instead of merely state that he is. Plausibility failed to
achieve this goal, and courts should now turn to illustrative notice pleading
to bring about the stability that our courts so desperately need.

230. See How to Write a Masterpiece of a Resume, ROCKPORT INSTITUTE,
http://www.rockportinstitute.com/resumes.htm l (last visited Sept. 14, 2011).
231. See Resume Tips, MIT CAREER DEVELOPMENT CENTER, http://www.mit.edu/~career/
guide/resumes.html (last updated Tues. Aug. 23, 2011, 9:39:44 AM).
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V. CONCLUSION
The proper role of a judge is to serve as a gatekeeper of the judicial
system. With limited resources and time, it is simply not practical, and may
in fact be impossible, for a court system to resolve every dispute that comes
before it. A judge is the only one positioned to ensure that judicial resources
are used wisely and efficiently. Under the Conley interpretation of the
pleading standard, judges were permitted to abandon this duty. The “no set
of facts” standard became an excuse for judges to avoid becoming involved
in a case until trial, the constant hope being that the case would be settled.
Adherence to the Conley interpretation of the pleading standard
essentially abrogated the judge’s responsibility to manage the judicial
resources under his charge. The process of pleading devolved into a nearmeaningless exercise of paperwork. Plaintiffs had no incentive to weigh the
merits of cases before filing a lawsuit because the liberal nature of discovery
allowed for speculative litigation. The result too often was that defendants
chose to settle meritless claims as opposed to enduring the costs and
burdens of discovery.
The remedy for the abuse of discovery by plaintiffs and abdication by
judges of the role as gatekeeper arrived in Twombly. Under the Twombly
standard of plausibility, the Court intended to force judges to consider
pleadings from a different perspective. The Court tried to reinforce this idea
in Iqbal by suggesting that a court is “to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense” in determining plausibility.232 This was an attempt at
clarifying the role of the judge revived under Twombly rather than a
heightening of the pleading standard. The Court did not intend the
stringency of the pleading standard to be substantively greater than under
Conley. Despite this, the Court’s decision to introduce plausibility resulted
in unnecessary confusion and frustration.
Courts should recognize that the plausibility standard became a great
harm to the goal of efficient jurisprudence and that redacting it from
precedent will pave the way for the ascendancy of illustrative notice
pleading. A revitalization of the authority that judges need to wield to bring
sanity back to America’s judicial system is a noble goal. The common sense
and prudence supporting illustrative notice pleading will ultimately save the
American judicial system.

232. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009).

